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SUMMARY: In Nos. 82-1326 & 82-1327, petrs contend that 
/{ L\ 
that an oute r continental shelf lease ~ale CA9 erred in finding 
Jt ,, -
is a federal activity ...... "directly affecting the coastal zone" under ------~ ............... ~
§307 (c) (1) of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. In No. 
82-1511, a conditional cross-petition, cross-petrs contend that 
CA9 erred in its construction of the phrase "to the maximum ex-
tent practicable" in §307 (c) (1). 
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: The Coastal Zone Management ~ 
Act of 1972 (CZMA) is designed to help preserve natural resources -----. ~ 
in coastal zones. The Act encourages each coastal state to adopt 
a coastal management plan. To obtain federal approval, such a 
plan must adequately consider the "national interest" and "the 
views of the Federal agencies principally affected by such pro-
gram." 16 u.s.c. §§1455 (c) (8), 1456 (b). Once a state plan has 
been approved by the Secretary of Commerce, the Federal Gover·n-
ment must take account of the plan as follows: 
"Each federal agency conducting or supporting 
activities hdirectl~ affecting ' the coastal zone 
shall conduc t or support t hOse activities in a 
manner which is, to the ''max,i_!llum extent ... Era_£ti-
qable~\ consistent with approved s Ea £e manage-
ment programs." §307 (c) (1), 16 u.s.c. 
§1456 (c) (1). 
The issue presented by the main petitions is the meaning of "di- ~ 
u•4cc.c.., 
rectly affecting;" the issue presented by the cross-petition is 





This litigation concerns the Department of the Interior's ~
(DOI) proposed sale of leases for exploratory drilling for oil ~ 
and gas off the coast of California. The principal issue is (4 
whether the proposed sale is consistent with the California j?~ 
Coastal Management Plan (CCMP), which was approved by the Secre-~ 
tary of Commerce in 1977. (Petr Western Oil and Gas Ass'n (WOGA) ~· 
and the American Petroleum Institute unsuccessfully sued to block 
federal approval of the CCMP. See American Petroleum Institute 
v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889 (CD Cal. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 1306 
(CA9 1979).) In April 1981 the State and various political sub-
divisions brought suit against DO! and the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, claiming that the sale c~uld not go forward until DOI had 
made a determination of whether the sale was consistent with the 
CCMP. A similar suit was filed by several environmental groups. 
WOGA and various oil companies intervened in both suits, which 
were consolidated. 
The dispute concerns Lease Sale 53, which consists of 243 
designated tracts of the outer continental shelf in five differ-
ent basins off the California coast, including the Santa Maria 
Basin (which extends from Point Sur in Monterey County south to 
Point Conception in Santa Barbara County). In 1978, following 
proceedings involving public participation by oil companies, gov-
ernmental agencies, environmental groups, etc., DO! announced a 
tentative tract selection for the sale. The final environmental 
impact statement was released in September 1980. The u.s. Geo-
...., ~ ............... ---~~ .... ....-_.... ... 
logical Survey estimated that the Santa Maria Basin had a reserve 




On October 16, 1980, Secretary Andrus issued a proposed no-
tice of sale for Lease Sale 53, but covering only the Santa Maria 
Basin (115 of the 243 tracts). In July 1980 the California 
Coastal Commission had asked the Secretary to submit a "cons is-
tency determination" pursuant to §307 (c) (1) of the CZMA i.e., 
a determination that the sale was consistent with the CCMP at 
the time of the issuance of the proposed notice of sale. But on 
~ .. ~ 
October 22, 1980, the Secretary not1fied the Commission that the -
preleasing activities had no "direct effects" on the coastal - --zone, and therefore that no consistency determination was re-___. 
qui red. In December 1980 the Commission adopted a resolution 
that, to be consistent with the CCMP, 32 tracts located in the 
northern portion of the Santa Maria Basin should be deleted from 
the lease sale. (The SG and WOGA state that California was con-
, ' 
cerned primarily with possible harm to the habitat of the south-
~n k,.ea ~t t:._e~: Califor;ia states that it was concerned as well 
~about negative effects on fishing, port access, tourism, etc.) vv~ 
~ In February 1981 ~ew DOI Secretary Watt issued a revise~ 
~notice of sale, which included the other -;-:r basin~ 
~
Sale 53. In April 1981 Governor Brown of California reiterated ~ 
that 32 tracts should be eliminated from the Santa Maria Basin ~ 
leasing. The same ' month Secretary Watt decided to divide Lease 
Sale 53 into two sales: the Santa Maria Basin tracts would be 
,/ 
sold in May 1981~ and the other basins would be leased later. He 
stated that his determination that the entire Santa Maria Basin 
should be leased, despite California's objections, was based on a 




sale was issued on April 27, 1981. 
Cal.iforn~ immediately sought an injunction in C.D. Cal. 
The DC (Pfaelzer, J.) allowed bids to be received and opened, but 
on May 27 preliminarily enjoined DOI from accepting or rejecting 
bids or issuing leases. In August 1981, on motions for summary 
judgment, the court ruled on the merits. On ,most of the issues, -
the Vo<? ruled for DOI. (These were claims under the National En-
~
vironmental Policy Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 
the Endangered Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act; 
none of these is presented for review here.) ~t th~led 
for the State on th~ Q1a !,m y_nd_gr~ 307 (c) (1) of the CZMA. The DC 6C:::::. 
::!n:e~~:v:::sc:::::::::::a:::a:: ) 
oil and gas development." (SG's Pet. at 46a.) The court voided 
t h e bids and ordered the deposits returned. It also enjoined any 
........... ... ....... 
further action with respect to leasing "until such time as de~~:L 
~f.-.tZ.nt:..l- ~-~.~ 
dants comply with the requirements of the [CZMA] by conducting a 
A.; •• -
~ 
consistency determination on the tracts at issue and by conduct-
ing all activities on these t racts in- a manner consistent with 
California's Coastal Management Plan." (Id., at 80a.) This 
...... ~ .......... 
order was stayed pending appeal. . ,,,. 
V' cA9 affirmed. It agreed with the DC that the only statute 
that supported the · S~te's position was the CZMA. The dispute ·,. 
centered on the meaning of "directly affecting." CA9 rejected ----the Government's argument that the direct effects of a lease sale 
do not include subsequent steps such as actual oil production: 
"[D]ecisions made at the lease sale stage in 
this case establish the basic scope and char-
I 
\ ter for subsequent development and production. 
Prior to the sale of leases, critical deci-
sions are made as to the size and location of · 
the tracts, the timing of the sale, and the 
stipulations to which the leases would be sub-
ject. These choices determine, or at least 
influence, whether oil will be transported by 
pipeline or ship, which areas of the coastal 
zone will be exposed to danger, the flow of 
vessel traffic, and the siting of on-shore 
construction. 
b. 
Under these circumstances Lease Sale 53 es-
tablished the first link in the chain of 
events which couid Iea'd toproauctton ""'and de-
velopment of oil and gas on the individual 
tracts leased. This is a Earticularly signif-
icant ~ because at ' this stage all- the 
tracts can be considered together, taking into 
account the cumulative effects of the entire 
lease sale, whereas at the later stages con-
sistency determinations would be made on a 
tract-by-tract basis." (Id., at 13a.) 
I 
in support of C /19 T CA9 made the following additional arguments 
this holding: ~
-The purpose of CZMA is to encourage federal-state coopera-
tion, and "[t]o effectuate this purpose, the state must be per-
mitted to become involved at an early stage." (Id., at 14a.) 
-This approach is "not inconsistent with the legislative 
history." Although there is little indication what Congress 
meant in passing §307(c) (1) in 1972, statements in House and Sen-
ate reports in 1976 and 1980 indicate that Congress intended ... 
state involvement at an early stage. Although such subsequent 
legislative statements are not conclusive, they should be given 
"appropriate weight" -- and here they deserve "substantial weight 
because they appear to us to serve bet.~er the purposes of the 
CZMA than would the narrower interpretation urged by the federal 
appellants." ( Id. , at 15a-16a.) 
-The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
( 
I • 
is the agency charged with promulgating regulations under the 
CZMA, and until May 1981 it took the view that final notices of 
outer continental shelf lease sales were subject to the consis-
tency requirement of §307 (c) (1}. (In 1981 the NOAA filed a no-
tice of proposed rulemaking to define "directly affecting" in the 
way the Government defines it here, but this rulemaking was sus-
pended following the DC decision in this case and following nega-
tive reactions from Congress.} 
-There is no inconsistency with the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act (OCSLA}, as amended in 1978. It is true that §19 of 
that Act requires DOI to consider state governors' recommenda-
tions regarding the "size, timing, and location" of lease sales. 
43 u.s.c. §1345(a}. But requiring DOI also to make a consistency 
determination under the CZMA will not be duplicative, for the two 
statutes have different purposes: the OCSLA focuses on oil and 
gas development, the CZMA on environmental concerns. Moreover, 
the OCSLA has a savings clause that expressly states that it does 
not modify the CZMA. 
If 
Having determined that §307(c} (1} applied at the lease sale 
\, 
stage, CA9 then turned to the question of what it would mean for 
the Government to act "consistently" with the State's plan. The 
Government argued that the DC' s injunction required the Govern-
ment to conform its sale to the CCMP. Assuming arguendo that the 
DC had imposed this requirement, CA9 rejected it: 
"The statute does not provide that a state's 
plan takes precedence when it would preclude 
the federal activity, or even that the federal 
activi.ty must be as consistent with the plan 
as is possible. It only provides that the 
activity be consistent to the maximum extent 
practicable. The Act is not explicit with 
respect to the location of final authority to 
determine whether the required consistency · ) 
exists. We believe such authority must reside 
in the Executive Branch of the federal govern-
ment subject, of course, to such judicial re-
view as is appropriate." (Id., at 19a (empha-
sis in original).) 
8. 
The court noted that the CZMA provides for mediation by the Sec-
retary of Commerce of disputes between DOI and a State as to the 
"consistency" of a federal activity with a State's plan. 
Finally,~A9 discussed the issue of remedy. "The premise on 
which [the DC's] order rests appears to be that California's view 
of consistency ultimately will be controlling. We do not agree 
with this premise." (Id., at 23a.) Therefore, CA9 affirmed only 
that portion of the order requiring a consistency determination 
('-- before the sale. The CA vacated the DC's order that the bids be 
voided and the deposits be returned. The court retained juris-
diction over the appeal. 
CONTENTIONS: A. The Main Petitions 
Petrs -- CA9 effectively has deleted the term "directly" 
from the statutory phrase "directly affecting." Under its inter-
---~ ----- ..,. - - ..... 
pretation, this word simply has no meaning. The DC called the 
Government's "plain meaning" argument a "subterfuge," and CA9 
said a "narrow definition" would be inconsistent with the purpose 
of the Act. But the fact is that the word "direct" has a common-
sense and restricted meaning. For example, "(t]he word 'direct' 
implies that the activity or condition invoked or blamed shall 
operate proximately -- not mediately, remotely, or collaterally -
- to produce the effect." Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 
238, 307 (1936). In this regard, it is noteworthy that NEPA reg-
. ( '----...--
':J. 
ulations define "direct effects" as those "which are caused by 
the action and occur at the same time or place," whereas "indi-
rect effects" are those "reasonably foreseeable" effects that are 
"caused by the action" but "are later in time or farther removed 
in distance." 40 C.F.R. §1508.8. Under this type of definition, 
any oil and gas development that ultimately may occur is not a 
direct effect of the lease sale itself. The plain meaning of the 
statute therefore should have been followed. CA9 1 s reliance on 
the gratuitous construction in the 1980 congressional reports was 
erroneous. 
CA9 1 s decision also disrupts Congress 1 carefully designed 
scheme for the development of outer continental shelf resources. 
Under §307(c) (3) (B) of the CZMA, federal licensees or permittees 
must supply consistency certifications for any "activity affect-
ing land or water uses in the coastal zone." If the State vetoes 
such a certification, the application must be rejected, unless 
the Secretary of Commerce determines to override the veto based 
on a finding that the activity is consistent with the state plan 
or is in the interest of national security. 16 u.s.c. 
§1456 (c) (3). Thus, there must be a consistency determination 
before any activity is undertaken by the licensees. And the 
OCSLA makes clear that such a consistency determination is re-
quired prior to either exploration, 43 u.s.c. §1340(c) (2), or 
production or development, 43 u.s .c. §§1351 (d), (h) (1) (B). Ac-
cordingly, there is no need for a consistency determination be-
(~ fore leasing. Indeed, at that stage there simply is insufficient 
information on which to base a consistency determination, for the 
1 
..&..V o 
would-be lessee has not yet received its authorization to survey 
the area. For that reason, Congress expressly rejected an amend-
ment that would have put the word "lease" into §307(c) (3). 
Moreover, in 1978 Congress rewrote the OCSLA to promote "the 
swift, orderly and efficient exploitation of our almost untapped 
domestic oil and gas resources in the Outer Continental Shelf." 
Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Foundation, 454 u.s. 151, 154, n. 2 
(1981). The whole point was to divide the process into discrete 
stages. 
"Under the amended OCSLA, a lease does not 
authorize the lessee to explore, develop or 
produce oil and gas. To engage in these ac-
tivities, the lessee must seek separate feder-
al approvals, first to explore for oil and gas 
and later to develop and produce the resource. 
As restricted by the OCSLA, a lease is a prop-
erty interest that only entitles the holder to 
conduct certain preliminary surveys prior to 
submitting an exploration plan for approval. 
The 'direct' effects of a lease sale, there-
fore, are extremely limited, and do not in-
clude the effects of potential exploration, 
development and production activities for 
which the lessee may eventually obtain approv-
al." (SG's Pet. at 15.) 
This decision will invite litigation at the lease stage, 
which is precisely what the OCSLA meant to discourage. Indeed, 
offshore lease sales repeatedly have been challenged. 
Finally, the decision may severely disrupt a wide range of 
federal activities. Twenty-eight states have coastal management 
~
plans that have been approved by the Federal Government. Since 
§307 (c) (1) now must be satisfied whenever a federal agency "sets s edt 
in motion a chain of events that may lead to impacts on the ~ !:!~ 
coastal zone," there are many federal activities that may be af--~ 
 .. fected. (Id., at 20 n. 31.) 
..L..Le 
{ Resps -- [For the most part, resps make the same basic argu-
me~ (See pp. 5-7 supra.) Therefore, I will summa-
rize only their addi tiona! arguments and the points they empha-
size.] 
Petrs err in suggesting that under CA9's interpretation ev-
erything will become a "direct effect." For example, "if a fed-
eral agency were to impose a restriction on foreign oil imports, 
one might well hypothesize 'effects' on a state's coastal zone 
from the resulting inducement for additional domestic OCS oil and 
gas production. However, that kind of effect is one which clear-
ly operates 'indirectly.'" (Brief for Resps at 10.) 
The lease sale stage is the only stage at which federal ac-
tivities are involved in outer continental shelf oil development. 
At subsequent stages, only industry licensees take action. 
Therefore, if petrs' view is adopted, "the 'federal activity' in 
the OCS process would never be subjected to review for consisten-
cy. Petitioners' argument fails to recognize the important deci-
sions made at the lease sale stage and runs counter to the case 
law requiring environmental revie~ at the earliest stages of such 
a phased decisionmaking process." (Id., at 17.) 
It also is noteworthy that the Department of Justice in 1979 
rendered an opinion to DOI stating that §307(c) (1) did apply to 
lease sales. This is the same view adopted by NOAA and by Con-
gress in the 1980 legislative reports. 
This decision will not have far-reaching consequences. In-
( deed, "it is certainly arguable that there will be less delay and 
disruption of OCS leasing if state management programs are ap-
12. 
plied in §307(c) (1) consistency review at the lease sale stage, 
••• than if the states are relegated to review of individual ex-
ploration and development plans under §307(c) (3) at a later stage 
of the process." (Id., at 27 (emphasis in original).) 
Petrs' Reply -- Resps' suggestion that the requirement here 
is merely one of "environmental review" is wrong. The consisten-
cy requirement is substantive, not procedural, and this means 
that there will be continuous litigation over the question wheth-
er the federal lease sale conforms "to the maximum extent practi-
cable" to the state coastal management plan. Nearly every lease 
sale held subsequent to CA9's decision has been challenged, and 
the DC in Massachusetts recently held that the Secretary failed 
to satisfy his substantive burden of establishing consistency, 
notwithstanding a 30-page agency opinion. 
Resps are wrong that the Department of Justice took the po-
sition that lease sales were subject to §307 (c) (1). DOJ did dis-
agree with DOl's broad view of its exemption, but DOJ also dis-
agreed with NOAA's construction of the word "directly affecting." 
Resps continue to offer no definition of "directly" that gives it 
any content. 
B. The Cross-Petition 
Cross-petrs -- This cross-petn is filed "out of an abundance 
of caution to insure that arguments dealing with that portion of 
the Ninth Circuit's opinion examining the phrase 'to the maximum 
extent practicable' can be presented to the Court in the event 
( that it grants certiorari to review the question presented by the 
I 




CA9 should not have construed the phrase "to the maximum 
extent practicable" in this case, for the issue will not become 
ripe unless and until DOI makes a consistency determination, the 
State decides how to respond, and the Secretary of Commerce medi-
ates any dispute that may arise. Furthermore, even if the issue 
were ripe, CA9 erred in suggesting that the Federal Government 
has ultimate power to override the state coastal management plan 
in the event of a conflict. 
Cross-resps -- The SG does not oppose the granting of the 
conditional cross-petition. 
~ 
WOGA opposes the granting of the cross-petition. If this 
Court reverses CA9' s construction of "directly affecting," the 
issue raised in the cross-petition will have little significance. 
On the other hand, if the Court agrees in whole or in part with 
CA9, the Court "will have ample opportunity to discuss the issue 
of concern to respondents/cross-petitioners in the context of the 
issues raised by petitioners." Response at 3. 
DISCUSSION: It seems doubtful that review is warranted 
on the ground that the legal issue raised has any general signif-
icance. Only · one statute is af issue~ · there is no allegation ..BJNI~ 
- Awz .....,_,.-,'- ' 
that other federal statute~ have the same "direct effects" test~ ~ · 
~ 
and there is no conflict. Thus, the case for cert must rest on a 
view that (i) CA9 may well be wrong, and (ii) the subject matter 
of the litigation .is of sufficient national importance to warrant 
{ correction of the possible error. 
The correctness of CA9's decision is not certain. I agree 
( 
I 
with the SG that it is hard to find 
r~lJ" under CA9' s construction. The definitions of· "direct 
effects" and "indirect effects" in the NEPA regulations seem more 
in accord with the usual construction of those phrases. Also, 
the result is somewhat inconsistent with the OCSLA. OCSLA re-
quires that DOI consider the State Governor's recommendations on 
the "size, timing, and location" of lease sales. 43 u.s.c. 
§1345. Yet CA9 found that §307 (c) (1) 's consistency requirement 
must apply at the lease sale stage because "critical decisions 
are made as to the size and location of the tracts, the timing of 
the sale, and the stipulations to which the leases woulo be sub-
ject." (SG's Pet. at 13a.) Normally a court should construe 
related statutes in a manner that avoids such a substantial over-
~ 
C:f'l:Z:.~_ • .. ; A. lap. ,~~-"" 
that this is ) 
a case where a CA has gone wild in reading its policy preferences 
into a statute. CA9's construction of the statute is reasoned 
On the other hand, I reject the SG's suggestjon 
~ ----...-. 
and defensible. Moreover, the court expressly rejected the no-
~
tion that a state unilaterally could thwart outer continental --
shelf development, as it held that final authority to decide 
whether consistency exists to the maximum extent practicable 
~-----------------------------------"must reside in the Executive Branch of the feder al government 
subject, of course, to such judicial review as is appropriate. 
To hold otherwise on the basis of silence, or at best attenuated 
inferences drawn from the language of Congress, weighs too light-
ly the interests of the nation against that of a state." (SG Is 
Pet. at 19a-20a.) 
. ( 
.l::>. 
Petrs contend that CA9's decision still will cause delays in 
leasing, and that the courts may prevent the Secretary from exer-
cising his "final authority" by overturning his decisions on ju-
dicial review. These are valid points borne out by the number of 
suits filed challenging the Secretary's determination of consis-
tency and by the decision in D. Mass. holding that the consisten-
cy determination prepared for OCS Lease Sale No. 52 (North Atlan-
tic) failed to prove consistency to the maximum extent practica-
ble. (See cases cited in SG's Reply at 3-4.) But I would note 
that quest ions concerning ( i) the final authority of the Secre-
tary in making consistency determinations and ( i i) the standard 
of judicial review of those determinations are different from the 
narrower question presented here as to whether the Secretary must 
make such a determination at all. · The Court may well want to 
review the former issues, but this is not the case in which to do 
so. 
I therefore think the Court should '1eny'\ these petitions. 
~ ~~ ._....__. 
This case involve~ complex statutes, and CA9' s construction, 
.'-"""' ._...._..- .. ....... 
while not free from doubt, is a reasonable one. If Congress does 
~----------------------------not think so, it may act to change the statute by expressly pro-
viding that lease sales are exempt from §307 (c) (1). Indeed, I 
suspect that, given the strong interests on either side, the 
issue '\ill be brought back to the Congress no matter how this 
case comes out. 
If cert is granted in the main petitions, the conditional 
cross-petition should be granted. The Court presumably would 
want to consider the meaning of §307(c) (1) in its entirety, and a 
{ 
grant of the cross-petition would ensure that the "to the maximum 
extent practicable" standard would be before the Court. 
WOGA has requested that the case be expedited and set for 
argument at the earliest possible time. In the event the Court 
grants cert, I recommend that the case be set for argument in 
October. 
RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial of all petitions. 
In No. 82-1326 there is a response and a reply. In No. 82-
1327 there is a response and a reply. In No. 82-1511 there are 
two responses. 
04/26/83 Newell Opinion in petn 
men 04/26/83 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
May 12, 1983 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 2 
No. 82-1511-CFX 
California, et al. 
v. 
Watt, et al. 
Cert to CA9 (Sneed, Tang, 
Pregerson) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
Please see memo in No. 82-1326, with which this conditional 
cross-petition is curve-lined. 
I recommend denial. 
There are two responses. 
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lfp/ss 10/24/83 WATT SALLY-POW 
81-1326 Watt, et al v. California et al. 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This is a very "bobtail" memo to refresh my 
recollection. I have not yet seen a bench memo from 
David. ~~~~~~ 
v'olves offshore oil leasing by the 
Deprtment of Interior. There are good briefs on both 
sides. My tentative reaction is that CA9 should be 
reversed, as urged by the SG and also in an excellent 
brief filed by Covington & Burling on behalf of Western 
Oail & Gas Association. 
In 1953 Congress enacted legislation that 
granted coastal states the ownership of submerged lands 
within three miles of their coasts, but reserved for the 
federal government proprietary control over the soil and 
seabed of the outer continental shelf (OCS) i.e. outs ide 
of the coastal zone granted the states. In view of the 
national policy underlying this major legislation, it is 
argued that no subsequent statutes should be read as 
increasing the authority of states over the coastal zone 
absent quite explicit language. 
. f'[1o 
The two statutes primarily involved here are the 
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA) and the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) . The CZMA 
§307 (c) (1) thereof - provides that federal "activities 
directly affecting the coastal zone" are subject to the 
substantive requirement that they be conducted in a manner 
consistent "to the maximum extent practicable" with an 
approved state coastal zone management program. 
The specific question is whether the substantive 
consistency requirement of §307 (c) (1) applies to an OCS 
oil and gas lease sale conducted pursuant to the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act when that sale has no physical 
impact upon the coastal zone but merely sets in motion a 
chain of events that may eventually result in such an 
impact. 
All that has been done by the federal government 
up to this time is the granting of leases to the highest 
qualified bidders of substantial offshore acreage. 
Respondents - particularly the state of California and 
environmental groups - brought suit to require, before any 
leases were made, a showing by the federal government that 
the activity on the outer shelf is to be consistent "to 




management program approved by California. Respondents 
argued, and CA9 agreed, that the federal government must 
make this showing at the initial step (i.e., the leasing), 
as this commences a chain of events that may affect 
adversely the state's interest under its approved 
management program. 
Petitioner answers, persuasively I think, that 
the leases authorize only extremely limited activities, 
and that further federal approval is required at each of 
( 
three other stages: (i) prior to exploration; (ii) prior 
to development; and (iii) prior to actual production. 
(See SG's brief p. 7). 
Under regulations of the Interior Department, 
the holder of a lease is limited to conduct "preliminary 
activities" on the ocs. These activities are defined as 
"geophysical and other surveys necessary to develop a 
comprehensive exploration plan" so long as such activities 
"do not result in any physical penetration of the seabed 
of greater than 300 feet of unconsolidated formations", 
and "do not result in any significant adverse impact on 
the natural resources of the OCS". At the leasing stage, 
it is argued that possible future effects on the coastal 
zone are not predictable, and in any event do not 
"directly affect the coastal zone". Only the subsequent 
activities - exploration, development and production - may 
directly affect the coastal zone. 
The petitioners rely on the plain language, 
legislative history and the paramount national interest in 
urging reversal of CA9. It is pointed out that CA9 's 
decision would unduly expand the substantive control by 
the states over energy development activities on the outer 
continental shelf. Congress did not intend to grant t~ 
7J...;..-- W&**<. 
states a veto over the issuance of an OSC lease.~~ 7-; 
~-~l-~cA7> 
The respondents advance the same arguments that ~. 
were accepted by CA9. In a word, they rely on the phrase 
in §307 (c) (1) "to the maximum extent practicable" and 
contend that this requires a demonstration of substantive 
consistency at every stage of the oil and gas activities 
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Questions Presented 
(1) Whether the sale of outer continental shelf leases 
by the Secretary of the Interior is in this case a federal -activity "directly affecting the coastal zone" under section - ... 
307(c) (1) of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 u.s.c. § 
1456 (c) (1). 
(2) If the sale is subject to section 307(c) (1), by what 
criteria~~·~e wAe~ld be determined to be consistent with the 
"' state coastal zone management plan "to the maximum extent 
practicable," as required by that section. 
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I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
The Coastal Zone Management Act (the CZMA), whose 
interpretation is at as designed to 
encourage the states to implement programs to preserve the 
natural environment of coast waters and adjacent shoreland. The 
Submerged Lands Act had granted submerged lands within three 
miles of the coast to the states, while retaining to the federal 
government control of the remaining outer continental shelf. See 
43 u.s.c. §§ 130l(a) (2) ~ 1311. Consistent with this delegation, 
the CZMA encouraged the states to establish management programs 
for the coastal waters and required any federal agency whose 
activities "directly affect[] the coastal zone to conduct 
those activities in a manner to the maximum extent 
practicable consistent with" the state program. Section 
307 (c) (1), codified at 16 u.s.c. § 1456 (c) (1). 
The CZMA also addresses the activities of private 
individuals whose conduct is subject to federal approval. 
Section 307(c) (3) (A), 16 u.s.c. § 1456(c) (3) (A), requires 
applicants for federal licenses or permit to certify that their 
activities are consistent with state management programs. 
Subpar. B of that subsection requires leaseholders of mineral 
interests under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to certify 
consistency with state programs before embarking upon 
exploration, development, or production under the lease. 
The second statute relevant to this case is the Outer 
... 
,, 
statute provides for the leasing of the outer continental shelf 
for mineral production and establishes a comprehensive system of 
federal and state approval for each step of the process of 
exploiting the minerals -- exploration, development and 
production. 43 u.s.c. § 1337. The first steps of the leasing 
process are the development of a five-year leasing program, id. § 
1344(a), and the consideration of bids by the Secretary, id. § 
1337(a). At each of these steps, the Secretary must consider 
comments on his proposals submitted by governors of states whose 
coastal areas might be affected. 
The present case presents the questions whether 
/I ( '\ 
Secretary's decision t~ lease a tract is subject to the section ,.....----._ 
307(c) (1) requirement of maximum practicable consistency with 
state coastal management programs, and, if so, what is the proper 
interpretation of that requirement. 
B. Facts and Proceedings Below 
This litigation arose from California's efforts to 
prevent the Interior Department from selling oil and gas leases 
for tracts off the coast of California. After the Interior 
Department had begun selecting specific tracts for the sale, the 
California Coastal Commission requested the Secretary of the 
' Interior to prepare a consistency determination to accompany the 
proposed notice of sale. When the Secretary issued the notice, 
he informed the Commission that it had determined that the lease 
sale would have not "direct effects" on the coastal zone, so that 




' ~ I. 
As provided by the OCSLA, the governor of California 
submitted recommendations that certain tracts be deleted from the 
sale. The Secretary determined, however, that "overriding 
national interest" required that the lease sale proceed as 
originally planned. 
California then sought an injunction in DC, contending 
that the Secretary was required to prepare a consistency 
determination under section 307(c) (1) before conducting the lease 
sale. The DC found that there was "ample evidence within the ~L)-< 
/1 ~ 
administrative record" ~ di~ _;f_!e~t~ on the coas~ zone. ~ _ 
Petn, at 7la. Examples of such effects included: operation of 
boats and aircraft by lessees; possible oilspills; the effects of 
pipelaying, drilling construction and s~wage discharge on water 
quality, marine life, and nearby recreational facilities; the 
impact on the region of labor migrating to the area to work on 
';li \' 
oil and gas operations. The DC ~nnulled any bids received for ... 
the tracts and any leases awarded and enjoined the Secretary from 
conducting the lease sale "until such time as rpetrs] comply with 
the requirements of the Coastal Zone Management Act by conducting 
a consistency determination on the tracts at issue and by 
conducting all activities on these tracts in a manner consistent 
with California's Coastal Management Plan." 
The CA affirmed the DC's holding and modified its 
lj 
injunction. The CA agreed that the lease sale directly affected - ----the coastal zone, citing the DC's list of effects and concluding 
that "decisions [at this stage] establish the basic scope ••• 
[of] subsequent development and production ..•. [C]ritical 
be. -
decisions are made as to the size and location of the tracts, the 
timing of the sale, and the stipulation to which ~ leases would 
Petn, at 14a. The CA found, howeveh4hat bids t: fit{ be subject." 
should not be cancelled until the Secretary had 
conduct a consistency determination on the lease 
an opportunity to ----
sale ?3'Fur ther, 
the CA vacated those portions of the injunction that required the 
Secretary to conduct his activities consistent with California's 
-------~----------------------------------------------
coastal management plan. Rather, section 307(c) (1) required the 
Secretary to act consistently with th~ "to the maximum 
extent practicable," taking into account such factors as the 
extent to which exploitation of mineral resources would be 
hampered by conformity, the reasonableness of the state plan, and 
the terms of the lease sale. Petn, at 24a. 
II. Discussion 
;P..t.a.L~ #A~-A~..t.J-' ~/~L-~/~~ 
A. Meaning of "Directly Affect" ~,-·~-7 
1. Statutory Language and Structure. -- This controversy 
cannot be resolved by reference to the "plain meaning" of section 
307 (c) (1). The use of the term "directly" indicates that not all 
effects are to be considered in deciding whether a consistency 
determination is required. But what effects are sufficiently 
immediate to be "direct" is a question of degree which can only 
be resolved by considering the ~Congress intended to 
advance by this provision. 
The structural relationship between the CZMA and the 
OCSLA gives some indication of the scope of "directly affect." 
The CZMA itself distinguishes between activities by federal 
agencies -- to which the section 307(c) (1) consistency 
. '
.. . 
requirement applies -- and activities of private individuals 
under federal license-- to which section 307(c) (3) applies. In 
particular, as noted above, section 307(c) (3) (B) requires oil and 
gas lessees to certify consistency with state management programs 
before receiving permission to explore, develop or produce gas 
and oil under their leases. The absence of a corresponding 
provision for section 307(c) (1) is not itself conclusive: 
Congress may have thought that section clearly applicable by its 
terms to federal activities about leasing, and it is conceded 
that section 307(c) (1) 's term "federal activities" embraces -
federal leasing decisions. WOGA Brief, at 26 n.l9. See also 
...--
Joint Appendix, at 37-45 (opinion of the Office of Legal 
Counsel). -
However, that these subsequent private activities are .. 
subject to consistency review indicates that Congress did not 
intend to place the entire burden of determining compliance with 
state programs on the initial federal decision to lease for oil 
and gas development. As the government suggests, the "directly 
affecting" provison ·would determine at what stage of the leasing 
process initial lease sale, or permit to explore, develop, or 
extract :§environmental impacts of the lease are to be 
considered. The legislative history and the policies underlying 
the statute confirm that this point is the key to applying the 
"directly affecting" language to the present case. 
2. Legislative History. -- The legislative history of 
these provisions contains no express indication of what Congress 
specifically intended in choosing the "directly affecting" 
language or in its subsequent amendments of CZMA and OCSLA. 
1971 Bill. Congress first considered the Coastal Zone 
C.P_p~_ 
Management Act in 1971. Resps- Fely heavily on the Senate Report 
on the proposed bill, which indicates that federal programs 
having a "functional interrelationship from an economic, social, 
or geographic standpoint with waters within the coastal zone 
should be administered consistent with the approved state 
management programs." S. Rep. 92-526, at 20, 30. However, the 
proposed bill in 1971, never acted on by either House, did not 
contain the "directly affecting" provision. By its terms, it 
imposed consistency requirements only on federal activities 
conducted "within the coastal ..• zone." Id., at 7 (section 
313(a) of proposed bill). The Committee's statement indicates 
only that activities within the zone will have to be consistent 
with state programs insofar as they have an impact on those 
programs; it does not contemplate extending the requirement to 
federal activities outside of the coastal zone. 
1972 Act. The next step in the legislative history is 
the passage in 1972 of the Coastal Zone Management Act. Neither 
the Senate nor the House bill applied consistency requirements to 
federal activities "directly affecting" state coasts; rather, the 
bills applied to activities within state coastal zones. Neither 
the Senate nor the House reports therefore sheds light on the 
meaning of the phrase. 
The SG speculates that the "directly affecting" language 




differed, whether federal activities on federal lands within the 
coastal zone were included in the Act. Under the compromise, 
these federal activities are included in the Act provided they 
have the requisite "direct effects." The difficulty with this 
speculation is that this provision not only "compromises" the 
narrow question that the SG proposed it was intended to address, 
but also changes the entire focus of the statute by deleting the I 
requirement that the activities be within the coastal zone at 
all. Perhaps the Conference Committee, in attempting to resolve 
the narrow issue, realized that it made more sense to define the J ,., 
} 
scope of the statute by reference to the impact rather than the ~ 
~~-j-' \' 
In any case, the ~ 
1\ 1-o 
Conference Report is silent on these problems; and the history of ~~· 
location of the federal activities in question. 
the language itself does not indicate whether "directly 
affecting" is to receive a narrow or broad reading. 
~76 Amendments. The next step in the legislative ~~ 
process is the 1976 amendment of the CZMA. The amendments added ~~ •• ~, 
to section 307(c) (3) new subpar. (B), which sets out procedures 
for compliance of oil and gas lessees with state management 
programs during exploration, development and production on the 
lease. As I have noted above, these provisions are critical 
~ ------------------~----because they reflect congressional intent as to when the 
consistency determination should be made. The legislative 
history confirms this point, but does not advert specifically to 
the interpretation of "directly affec~ed." . 
First, the Senate and House committees both recommended 
amending section 307(c) to impose on applicants for federal 
,f,. J .. ~ 
leases the same consistency requirements imposed on applicants 
for federal licenses and permits. As the Senate explained, the 1 
Secretary of the Interior would have had to seek certification of 
consistency before entering into binding lease agreements. S. 
Rep. No. 94-227, at 19-20. The Interior Department opposed the 
amendment because it required a consistency determination before 
the effects of mineral operations could realistically be assessed 
and because it would by its terms apply to every one of the 
myriad of permits that a lessee might at various points be 
required to obtain. On the floor of the House, the amendment was 
deleted in response to these concerns. 122 Cong. Rec. 6128 
(1976). 
The Conference Committee resolved this difference 
between the Senate and the House by adopting the current version~ 
of the CZMA, section 307(c) (3) (B). The Committee explains 
its purpose was "specifically [to] appl[y] the consistency 
requirement to the basic steps in the .•• leasing process," 
thereby providing the states with "complete information on a 
timely basis" about offshore drilling. The amendment was 
designed to accommodate the government's concern about which 
steps in the leasing process would be subject to consistency 
determinations and about proper timing of the consistency 
determination. 
1978 Amendments to the OCSLA. In 1978, Congress amended 
the OCSLA to refer to the consistency requirements it had already 
written into the CZMA. Further, Congress added procedures to 






decisions: governors submit recommendations which the Secretary 
must accept if "reasonable." Section 19 of OSCLA, 43 u.s.c. § 
1345. 
Arguably, this provision might have exempted the 
Secretary from the additional requirements of the CZMA, section 
307(c) (1). For it seems redundant to require the Secretary to 
consider the consistency of his proposals with the state's 
coastal management plan when he must consider the state 
government's recommendations in any event. However, I agree with 
P/71 
the reasoning of the Office of Legal Counsel that the amendments 
A 
to the OCSLA do not accomplish such an implied repeal. See J.A., -
at 44-45. First, section 608(a) of the 1978 OCSLA amendments 
indicates that nothing in the amendments should be construed to 
repeal the CZMA. Second, given the explicit and careful cross-
references from the amendments to the CZMA, it is hard to believe ~ 
that Congress intended to repeal a section of that Act by ~·-
implication. Third, the House report on the amendments indicates ~\· 
-· ~· ~1-f..f/V\-
that "lease sales and approval of development and product plans 
must comply with 'consistency' requirements ••• ,"and disclaims 
any intent to modify the CZMA in this respect. H.R. Rep. No. 95-
590, at 153 n.52. 
1980 Report. In 1980, Congress adopted further 
amendments to the CZMA not directly relevant here. The House 
report on these amendments does contain an interpretation of 
"directly affecting the coastal zone." The Committee cites with 
approval the "functional interrelationship" test formulated in 
the 1971 report. Consistency requirements should apply when "the 
management program's policies are likely to apply to the 
[Federal] activity" or "when a Federal agency initiates a series 
of egents of coastal management consequence." H. Rep. 96-1012, ~ 
~t...~'~ at 34. 
Although the Court has sometimes given weigh~ to ~~~ 
subsequent legislative history, such history must be 1nterpre~~.~ -- ~ "wi~rr extreme care." Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 u.s. 657, 666 W · 
n.8 (1980). The House report is entitled to relatively little 
weight. The committee acknowledged that the interpretation of 
the "directly affecting" language was "uncertain," and cited the 
disagreement between California and the Interior Department that 
has given rise to this suit. The committee pointedly chose not 
to attempt to pass a clarifying amendment, and referred instead 
to Dept. of Commerce mediation of such disputes and to new 
regulations to be issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), the agency charged with administering the 
statute. In these circumstances, to give substantial weight to 
the committee report would permit the committee unilaterally to 
amend the statute. 
3. Administrative Regulations. -- The NOAA regulations 
offer no guidance in interpreting the statute. The NOAA adopted 
first a broad de~on of, "di-;;ctly arfecting'" 43 Fed. Reg. 
10510, 10511, 10519 (1978) ("significantly,""primary, secondary 
and cumulative effects")~ and then a narrow one, 46 Fed. Reg. 
26658, 26659 (1981) ("measurable physical alteration in the 
coastal zone"). Both definitions were withdrawn following 
expressions of legislative and executive disapproval. 
!<io:' ~· 
,. ' 
4. Policy Considerations. -- As a matter of policy, the 
terms "directly affecting" should be interpreted to further 
rational administration of the leasing procedures taken as a 
whole. As the government contends, the CZMA should not be 
construed to require premature consideration of environmental 
/ 
impacts for whose evaluation Congress has specifically provided 
at a later stage of the leasing process. Such a construction 
would fail to give proper effect to the specific provisions of 
the CZMA governing exploration, development and extraction on 
leased tracts; and would require the government to make 
predictions regarding environmental impact based on pure 
speculation even though it would do no harm to postpone analysis 
of environmental effects until more accurate assessments could be 
made. As noted above, this approach to section 307(c) (1) is 
supported by the structure of the statute and the legislative 
hi~, particularly of the 1976 and 1978 amendments. 
~)tvaluation of some decisions made by the Secretary when 
'\ 
deciding which leases to sell should not be postponed. For 
example, if the Department is trying to choose between leasing 
one of two different tracts, the choice between the two tracts 
should be made consistently with coastal management policy "to 
the maximum extent practicable," as the CZMA requires. It would 
be wasteful to proceed with exploration and development of one 
tract, only to discover at a later stage that the other tract 
could have been developed as efficiently but also more 
consistently with the state coastal management plan. The 
Secretary's plans as to what leases to sell "directly affect" the 
bench memo: Calif0~nia v. Watt page 14. 
coastal zone insofar as these plans commit the Department to 
immediate development of some, but not other, tracts. To this 
limited extent only, a consistency determination should be 
required. 
B. Appropriate Remedy 
Because the CA required a consistency determination, its 
judgment should be affirmed to that extent. However, the Court's 
--------------------------------------------opinion should make clear that such a determination is required 
only because of, and only with respect to, those aspects of the 
..,.,..- -
Department's planning decisions that 1~rrevocably commit the 
Department to a course of acti~n regarding choice of tracts to be --/( .,, 
leased. Impacts which inevitably result from any further 
"' development would also have to be considered. But the Department 
need not consider impacts that are unduly speculative and that 
may be controlled at a later stage. For example, the risk of oil 
spills will not eventuate if only gas is produced on a lease, and 
in any case may be controlled by safety devices. Applying this 
standard, the Secretary may determine again on remand that the 
leasing decision here has not "direct effect" on California's 
coastal management plan. 
Further, theCA correctly set out general standards as 
'-----------------------------~-------------
to the procedure for consistency determinations. The CA had to 
~---~--------------------------------------reach this issue in order to determine that the appropriate 
remedy in this case was a remand to the Secretary for a 
consistency determination. And the CA correctly concluded that 
t h 
11s t h f · 1 · b · 1 · \\ d · h ~h h e ecre ary as 1na respons1 1 1ty to eterm1ne w et er t e 
leasing program is consistent with state coastal management plans 
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immediate development of some, but not other, tracts. To this 
limited extent only, a consistency determination should be 
required. 
B. Appropriate Remedy 
Because the CA required a consistency determination, its 
judgment should be affirmed to that extent. However, the Court's 
----------------------------------------opinion should make clear that such a determination is required 
only because of, and only with respect to, those aspects of the --- -
Department's planning decisions that 1~rrevocably commit the 
Department to a course of acti~n regarding choice of tracts to be 
I ( 'I' 
leased. Impacts which inevitably result from any further 
,; 
development would also have to be considered. But the Department 
~ -
need not consider impacts that are unduly speculative and that 
may be controlled at a later stage. For example, the risk of oil 
spills will not eventuate if only gas is produced on a lease, and 
in any case may be controlled by safety devices. Applying this 
standard, the Secretary may determine again on remand that the 
leasing decision here has not "direct effect" on California's 
coastal management plan. 
Further, theCA correctly set out general standards as 
to the procedure for consistency determinations. The CA had to 
~---~--------------~---------'------------reach this issue in order to determine that the appropriate 
remedy in this case was a remand to the Secretary for a 
consistency determination. And the CA correctly concluded that 
t h 1 
1s t h f · 1 · b · 1 · \\ d · h ---::::..h h e ecre ary as 1na respons1 1 1ty to eterm1ne w et er t e 
leasing program is consistent with state coastal management plans 
"to the maximum extent practicable." While section 307 (c) (1) 
imposes a substantive requirement on the Secretary's decision, it 
contains absolutely no indication of a congressional intent to ~~ 
modify the Secretary's authority to make final leasing decisions ~ 
as established under the OCSLA. See 43 u.s.c. § 1334(a) (1). ~ 
Further, the OCSLA sets out specific procedures for state agenc
~ - .. 
participation in leasing decisions, and it would be anomalous to ~ i ~ 
~
consider that section 307(c) (1) provided in addition for a veto  
by the states. A major transfer of responsibility from a federa ; 
~  
agency to the states cannot be accomplished by congressional 
silence. 
As to the substance of the "maximum extent practicable" 
standard, the CA correctly observed that the limits the standard 
imposes "cannot be precisely delineated. [V]erbal formulas 
cannot eliminate the necessity of examing each situation with 
care and sensitivity to the concerns of the state and the 
nation." Petn, at 24a. Because the Secretary did not undertake 
a consistency determination, there is no administrative record ------------------
and no finding by the Secretary as to the meaning or application 
of the statutory standard. The case thus clearly differs from 
those in which the courts set forth appropriate standards on the 
basis of an administrative record and an agency decision which is 
under review. E.g., California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1311-1313 
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Louisiana Environmental Society, Inc. v. 
Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 86 (5th Cir. 1976). 
The question of the substantive meaning of "maximum 
extent practicable" is not ripe for further consideration. See 
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 u.s. 136, 148-156 (1967). 
First, it is not a purely legal issue in this case, for it 
depends upon application of the statute to the Secretary's 
leasing program as it affects California's coast management plan. 
Evaluations of practicability will depend heavily upon the facts 
and circumstances that may not yet be reflected in the record and 
that should be evaluated in the first instance by the Secretary. 
Further, the Secretary has taken no "final agency action" on the 
application of the standard, for he has not yet made a 
consistency determination in this case. Finally, it is not clear 
that any hardship to the parties would be adverted by abstract 
pronouncements by the Court at this time. 
III. Conclusion 
TheCA's judgment should be affirmed. However, the 
Court should make clear that the DC and the CA adopted too 
expansive an approach to defining impacts "directly affecting" a 
state's coastal management plan. Such impacts comprise only 
those which cannot be prevented by regulation at a later stage of 
the leasing process. The case should be remanded to the 
Secretary to apply this criterion to the tracts to be leased 
here. 
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